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Charter Values and Administrative 
Justice 
Lorne Sossin* and Mark Friedman** 
I. INTRODUCING THE PUZZLE OF CHARTER VALUES AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 
What would the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
1
 have 
looked like if it had been designed for administrative justice? This is a 
question underlying our analysis in this study. Ever since the Supreme 
Court made clear in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson that 
discretionary decisions of public officials were to be subject to the 
Charter,
2
 and expanded the reach of the Charter to most adjudicative 
tribunals,
3
 the Court has wrestled with the coherence of the relationship 
between the Charter and administrative justice. The Court attempted to 
chart a new path forward beyond a traditional application of the Charter 
to incorporate a potentially broader but inchoate set of “Charter values” 
in its 2012 decision Doré.
4
 With this decision as a point of departure, we 
elaborate below on the scope of Charter values and their distinct 
implication for administrative justice. 
                                                                                                             
*  Dean and Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. Material drawn from this paper was presented 
at the Osgoode Hall Law School Conference on Administrative Law and Practice, October 23, 2013, 
and at the CLE B.C. Administrative Law Conference in Vancouver on October 29, 2013, and we are 
grateful to the participants at those conferences for their comments and suggestions. We are also 
indebted to a number of colleagues who read and offered their thoughts on earlier drafts, including 
Benjamin Berger, Chris Bredt, Jamie Cameron, Peter Hogg, Allan Hutchinson, Grant Huscroft, 
Nicolas Lambert, Sheila Wildeman and David Wright. 
**  JD Candidate 2015. 
1  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2  [1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Slaight 
Communications”]. See June M. Ross, “Applying the Charter to Discretionary Authority” (1991) 29 
Alta. L. Rev. 382 [hereinafter “Ross”] (on the significance of Slaight Communications).  
3  See Nova Scotia v. Laseur, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.). Paul v. 
British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), [2003] S.C.J. No. 34, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585 (S.C.C.). 
and more recently R. v. Conway, [2010] S.C.J. No. 22, 2010 SCC 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Conway”]. 
4  Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, 2012 SCC 12 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Doré”]. 
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Administrative justice is defined by its diversity. While courts in 
every part of the country look roughly similar (all have a dais for the 
judge, a jury box, a chair for witnesses, counsel tables, a gallery for 
spectators, etc.), few people can close their eyes and picture what a 
landlord tenant board, immigration and refugee board or social benefits 
tribunal looks like. Yet that is where a vulnerable tenant goes to stave off 
eviction, where a refugee claimant goes to avoid deportation, and where 
a person whose benefits have been curtailed goes for recourse. In other 
words, vitally important disputes, involving fundamental rights and 
freedoms, are the province of widely disparate adjudicative bodies. There 
are literally hundreds of tribunals, at the federal, provincial and 
municipal levels, involving thousands of full- and part-time adjudicators 
applying a myriad of statutory schemes and regulatory regimes. If the 
Charter is to be Canada’s “supreme law”, it must have relevance for 
those who are most vulnerable to the adverse effects of government 
action (and inaction). If the Charter is to matter, it must matter in the 
realm of administrative justice. 
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) seemed to anticipate this state of 
affairs more than a decade ago in her oft-quoted dissent in Cooper v. 
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission),
5
 a case which probed 
the extent to which tribunals had jurisdiction to consider the 
constitutionality of their enabling legislation. The majority in Cooper 
held that a human rights commission lacked the authority to decide 
Charter questions because its purpose and structure were not aligned with 
the adjudication of Charter rights. Justice McLachlin’s dissent not only 
reached the opposite conclusion, but did so expressly on the grounds that 
the Charter should be relevant where people’s rights were determined. 
It included the following memorable reference: 
The Charter is not some holy grail which only judicial initiates of the 
superior courts may touch. The Charter belongs to the people. All law 
and law-makers that touch the people must conform to it. Tribunals and 
commissions charged with deciding legal issues are no exception. 
Many more citizens have their rights determined by these tribunals than 
by the courts. If the Charter is to be meaningful to ordinary people, then 
it must find its expression in the decisions of these tribunals.
6
  
                                                                                                             
5  [1996] S.C.J. No. 115, [1996] 3 S.C.R 854 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cooper”]. 
6  Id., at para. 70. 
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This passage was later adopted by a majority in Nova Scotia (Workers’ 
Compensation Board) v. Martin,
7
 where the Court reversed Cooper and 
confirmed that tribunals that have the power to decide any question of law 
will presumptively have the power to hear and adjudicate the Charter. 
In Conway,
8
 the Supreme Court extended administrative jurisdiction 
even further by establishing that tribunals that are competent to decide 
questions of law also have jurisdiction not only to consider Charter 
issues, but also to grant Charter remedies to the extent that those 
remedies are consistent with their enabling legislation. Tribunals can 
therefore be understood as adjudicative spaces that enjoy both full access 
to the Charter and a broad capacity for public engagement.  
In this line of case law, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that 
parties could seek Charter remedies from tribunals notwithstanding the 
practical challenges of doing so. The Court’s reticence to engage with the 
uneven capacity of administrative tribunals is understandable, if 
problematic. After all, the capacity of a tribunal or administrative 
decision-maker is not driven by a legislative enactment, but rather by 
executive action, and can vary depending on the staffing, appointments 
and resources of a particular tribunal at a particular time. That said, the 
capacities of a tribunal are central to the effectiveness of the Charter. 
As Abella J. observed in Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, 
Disability Support Program)
9
 (a case raising similar issues to Cooper and 
Martin but in the context of the jurisdiction over the Human Rights 
Code), ensuring access to a meaningful forum for having one’s rights 
adjudicated is a key aspect of access to justice. With respect to the Social 
Benefits Tribunal, she observed (in dissent): 
The [Social Benefits Tribunal] is meant to be an efficient, effective, and 
quick process. Yet it seems to be having difficulty meeting this 
mandate. In 2004-2005, the SBT Tribunal had a backlog of 9,042 cases 
and received 11,127 new appeals under the [Ontario Works Act] and 
the ODSPA. This Court recognized in Tétreault-Gadoury … that 
administrative bodies responsible for ensuring the payment of monetary 
benefits to eligible applicants would undoubtedly be impeded from this 
important and time-sensitive undertaking if they were asked to decide 
constitutional challenges. 
                                                                                                             
7  [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.). 
8  Supra, note 3. 
9  [2006] S.C.J. No. 14, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.). 
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Imposing Code compliance hearings on the Tribunal will similarly and 
inevitably impact its ability to assist the disabled community it was 
established to benefit in a timely way. It will be difficult to explain to 
the thousands of disabled individuals waiting for their appeals to be 
heard — many without any interim support — that there is any public 
benefit in the Tribunal hearing a complex, lengthy, and inevitably 
delaying jurisprudential issue with no precedential value. That is the 
real access issue in this case.
10
 
A similar argument, of course, could be brought to bear on the 
tribunal jurisdiction to apply formal Charter rights. Practical challenges 
may render the Charter illusory in the context of administrative justice. 
For example, is it likely that a self-represented party before the Social 
Benefits Tribunal will properly identify a Charter issue, or have the 
capacity to fashion submissions based on the current jurisprudence 
related to a particular Charter right? How realistic is it to imagine such a 
party responding to the Crown’s section 1 evidence? Will both legally 
and non-legally trained adjudicators have the capacity to manage Charter 
evidence? While some tribunals clearly can and are providing an 
appropriate forum for Charter adjudication, others seem ill-suited to the 
kind of Charter process designed by and for the courts in Canada. 
In our view, what is needed to realize the promise of the Charter in 
the context of administrative justice is a Charter practice that is designed 
by and for administrative justice. Such a sphere of practice will need to 
be far more pliable and adaptable than the context of the courts. 
Administrative decision-makers vary with respect to procedure as well as 
substantive and policy expertise — some are as adversarial as courts 
while others adopt a more activist approach to adjudication. Some 
involve inquisitorial processes which place the decision-maker in the 
position of eliciting the necessary information from the parties. Others 
still are discretionary or regulatory rather than adjudicative settings. 
Hearings may occur electronically, over the phone, in person, or in 
writing. Appearances before the Human Rights Tribunal may stretch into 
weeks of complex evidentiary testimony, while some hearings before the 
Landlord Tenant Board take less than 30 minutes. It is important that all 
these diverse contexts where Charter hearings may unfold have rules 
designed for a particular decision-maker’s context. Many tribunals across 
                                                                                                             
10  Id., at paras. 90-91. 
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Canada already have established Rules of Practice that guide applicants 
in raising constitutional matters.  
The Alberta Appeals Commission for Workers’ Compensation Board, 
for instance, establishes a determined time frame and method for raising 
constitutional claims: 
 3.3(1) A party who intends to raise a question of constitutional law 
before the Appeals Commission relating to the distribution of powers 
must first provide written notice of their intention to do so, at least  
14 days before the scheduled hearing date, to 
(a)  the Attorney General of Canada, 
(b)  the Minister of Justice of Alberta and the Attorney General of 
Alberta, 
(c)  the Appeals Commission, and 
(d)  every party. 
 (2) If the notice is not provided, the Appeals Commission must not 
consider the constitutional question. 
As Freya Kristjanson has emphasized, tribunals need to consider 
more than just adapting their rules to the requirements and realities of 
Charter litigation (including, for example, the requirement to provide 
Notice of Constitutional Question to the Government): 
Tribunals must consider the impact that the newly expanded Charter 
jurisdiction has on all aspects of tribunal design. Clear procedural rules, 
as discussed above, are merely the first step. Adjudicator education, 
and adaptation of existing rules to what may be significantly more 
complex types of Charter litigation, will be a challenge both in terms of 
competence and funding. Finally, these cases may be the harbinger of a 
new and exciting era in administrative law, fulfilling the Chief Justice’s 
vision of a Charter that belongs to the people, applied with full force in 
the administrative justice system.
11
 
While the development of distinctive Charter rules of practice for 
administrative justice is in some sense a welcome response to the 
concern over capacity and the logistics of tribunal hearings involving 
the Charter, occasions where a Charter issue is identified and argued by 
                                                                                                             
11  See Freya Kristjanson & N. Lambek, “The Charter in Context: Applying the Charter in 
Everyday Administrative Decision-Making”, Paper presented for 11th Annual Charter Conference, 
Ontario Bar Association, November 2012, at 28. 
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the parties will be rare in most tribunal settings. Charter values, as 
elaborated by the Supreme Court in Doré, by contrast, represent a 
broader and far more accessible way to ensure the Charter’s relevance to 
the sphere of administrative justice.  
While the promise of Charter values under the Doré framework is 
apparent, its potential application gives rise to a host of important 
questions.
12
 First, how does the Charter itself fit within Administrative 
Law? Second, what are the sources of Charter values, and are the 
categories of Charter values set or growing? Third, what is the scope of 
Charter values (for example, must a Charter value be tied to a Charter 
right or a specific section or sections of the Charter)? Fourth and 
finally, how can Charter values be operationalized within the 
administrative justice context in a way that is coherent, transparent, 
predictable and fair? This study is divided into three sections analyzing 
and addressing each of these questions and their implications for 
administrative justice. 
II. RECONCILING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE CHARTER 
Since the early days of Charter jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has 
wrestled with how to reconcile Charter and administrative law principles, 
particularly in the context of reviewing the exercise of administrative 
discretion.
13 
The Charter may justify intervention in administrative 
decisions in several different circumstances involving different degrees of 
discretion.
14
 
First, a law granting discretion may be unconstitutional by its very 
terms. For example, a law authorizing a tribunal to grant a benefit to a 
                                                                                                             
12  For a discussion of the challenges to which Charter values as set out in Doré give rise, 
see Evan-Fox Decent & Alexander Pless, “The Charter and Administrative Law: Cross-Fertilization 
or Inconstancy?” in L.M. Sossin & C.M. Flood, eds. Administrative Law in Context, 2d ed. (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 2012). 
13  See especially Slaight Communications, supra, note 2; Ross v. New Brunswick School 
District No. 15, [1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ross”]. Portions of 
this analysis are drawn from L. Sossin, “Discretion Unbound: Reconciling the Charter and Soft 
Law” (2003) 45 Can. Public Administration 465. Portions of the analysis to follow are drawn from 
S. Gratton & L. Sossin, “In Search of Coherence: The Charter and Administrative Law under the 
McLachlin Court” in D. Wright & A. Dodek, eds., Public Law at the McLachlin Court: The First 
Decade (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011). 
14  In most cases, the grounds for a Charter challenge in administrative discretion cases are 
based on violation of s. 2, 7 or 15, but the unconstitutional exercise of discretion might also be 
located elsewhere under the Charter. 
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defined group creates a discretion which, by its very terms, might violate 
section 15 of the Charter if it necessarily excludes another group from 
the benefit based on race, religion or one of the other enumerated or 
analogous grounds. For example, in M. v. H., a provision of Ontario’s 
Family Law Act was held to be discriminatory since it granted courts the 
discretion to award spousal support only to heterosexual spouses and not 
to same-sex couples.
15
 
The second circumstance involves a law that grants discretion to a 
tribunal that is not unconstitutional on its face, but such that it might 
nevertheless be applied in an unconstitutional manner. For example, in 
Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), a law authorizing the 
Medical Services Commission to fund certain health services was found 
not to violate the Charter, but the exercise of discretion by that 
Commission in deciding not to fund interpreters for deaf patients was 
found to be unconstitutional.
16
 Similarly, in Canada (Attorney General) 
v. PHS Community Services Society,
17
 a federal Minister’s discretion not 
to provide a statutory exemption to a safe injection site that provided 
vital health benefits to its clients was held to violate the Charter. The 
Court held that “[t]he discretion vested in the Minister of Health is not 
absolute: as with all exercises of discretion, the Minister’s decisions must 
conform to the Charter...”.18 
In the third circumstance, a law granting wide discretionary authority 
without sufficient guidance as to its application or without safeguards 
against arbitrary conduct might violate the procedural component of 
section 7 of the Charter. This basis for challenging discretion was relied 
upon by the majority of the Supreme Court in R. v. Morgentaler.
19
 In 
Morgentaler, the impugned provision was a law prohibiting abortion 
unless a physician determined that the life or health of a woman was 
endangered. The procedures that therapeutic abortion committees 
established in hospitals to decide whether this threshold was met in 
individual cases were found by the majority to lack coherence, 
predictability and fairness.  
Fourth, a law granting a discretion that is too vague to provide 
sufficient notice to those who might infringe it may violate the 
                                                                                                             
15  [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3. 
16  [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.). 
17  [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 2011 SCC 44 (S.C.C.). 
18  Id., at para. 117. 
19  [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morgentaler”]. 
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substantive component of section 7.
20 
For example, in R. v. Morales, the 
Court held that a provision granting pre-trial detention where it was 
justified in “the public interest” was unconstitutionally vague.21  
The Supreme Court’s first detailed examination of the relationship 
between the Charter and administrative discretion was in Slaight 
Communications.
22 
At issue in that case was a remedial discretion 
in the Canada Labour Code that allowed adjudicators to resolve 
grievances under collective agreements.
23 
The grievance in Slaight 
Communications concerned an allegation of wrongful dismissal. The 
adjudicator found that the dismissal had been wrongful and ordered 
the company, first, to provide the employee with a factual reference 
and, second, to refrain from expressing any other views about the 
employee. Chief Justice Dickson for the majority chose to conduct a 
Charter analysis and held that neither aspect of the adjudicator’s order 
violated the Charter. Justice Lamer (as he then was) dissented in part 
and would have resolved the dispute on administrative law grounds. 
However, Lamer J. wrote for the Court on the issue of the proper 
approach to discretionary decision-making under the Charter. He 
identified two kinds of discretion, each of which led to different 
remedies:  
1. The exercise of discretion was made pursuant to legislation which 
confers, either expressly or by necessary implication, the power to 
infringe a protected [Charter] right. 
—  It is then necessary to subject the legislation to the test set out in s. 1 
by ascertaining whether it constitutes a reasonable limit that can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
2. The legislation pursuant to which the administrative tribunal made 
the disputed order confers an imprecise discretion and does not 
                                                                                                             
20  See generally R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] S.C.J. No. 67, [1992] 
2 S.C.R. 606 (S.C.C.). 
21  [1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.). 
22  Supra, note 2. See Ross, supra, note 2. 
23  R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, as amended by S.C. 1977-78, c. 27, ss. 21, 61.5(9):  
Where an adjudicator decides pursuant to subsection (8) that a person has been unjustly 
dismissed, he may, by order, require the employer who dismissed him to (a) pay the 
person compensation not exceeding the amount of money that is equivalent to 
the remuneration that would, but for the dismissal, have been paid by the employer to the 
person; (b) reinstate the person in his employ; and (c) do any other like thing that it is 
equitable to require the employer to do in order to remedy or counteract any consequence 
of the dismissal. 
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confer, either expressly or by necessary implication, the power to 
limit the rights guaranteed by the Charter. 
—  It is then necessary to subject the order made to the test set out in s. 
1 by ascertaining whether it constitutes a reasonable limit that can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. …24 
In the circumstances of Slaight Communications, the Court found 
that the Labour Code did not require expressly or by necessary 
implication that a Charter right be infringed, since the arbitrator could 
have remedied the wrongful dismissal through other means; therefore, 
the Labour Code created an imprecise discretion that permitted a Charter 
right to be limited. Thus, it was the order, and not the legislation, that 
was subjected to Charter scrutiny.
25
 
The central holding of Slaight Communications was that no public 
official could be authorized by a statute to breach the Charter and 
therefore, all discretionary authority had to be read down to only 
authorize decision-making which is consistent with Charter rights and 
guarantees. Justice Lamer explained this reasoning in the following 
terms: 
Although this court must not add anything to legislation or delete 
anything from it in order to make it consistent with the Charter, there is 
no doubt in my mind that it should also not interpret legislation that is 
open to more than one interpretation so as to make it inconsistent with 
the Charter and hence of no force or effect. Legislation conferring an 
imprecise discretion must therefore be interpreted as not allowing the 
Charter rights to be infringed. Accordingly, an adjudicator exercising 
delegated powers does not have the power to make an order that would 
result in an infringement of the Charter and he exceeds his jurisdiction 
if he does so.
26
 
Thus, discretionary authority always comes with an implied 
condition, which is that it be exercised in a manner consistent with all 
applicable Charter rights. 
                                                                                                             
24  Slaight Communications, supra, note 2, at para. 91. 
25  The majority found that, while both the positive and the negative order violated the 
freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, each was a reasonable limit under s. 1 and 
therefore the orders were upheld. 
26  Id., at para. 87. 
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The principle in Slaight Communications was applied in subsequent 
cases
27
 where the Court highlighted the overlapping nature of the Charter 
and administrative law analysis, observing that it was difficult to 
conceive of a case where a court would conclude that a decision was 
unconstitutional but nonetheless reasonable. 
The Court confronted the dilemma of administrative discretion again 
in the context of Little Sisters Books and Art Emporium v. Canada 
(Minister of Justice).
28
 At issue was the discretionary authority of 
customs officials to seize imported goods that met the obscenity test 
under section 163 of the Criminal Code.
29
 Justice Binnie, writing for the 
majority, characterized the administration of the Customs Act
30
 by 
customs officers as oppressive and dismissive of the appellants’ freedom 
of expression. He concluded that the effect — whether intended or not — 
was to isolate and disparage the appellants on the basis of their sexual 
orientation. 
The Court also held that, although the exercise of discretion by 
customs officers violated the Charter, the Customs Act provision 
authorizing this conduct did not. Following the Slaight Communications 
approach, the majority of the Court characterized the discretion 
contained in the customs legislation as capable of being applied in a 
fashion consistent with the Charter. Therefore, the majority saw no basis 
to strike down the authority of customs officials to seize material on the 
grounds of obscenity.
31
 
Sometimes, the Court may apply a Charter and administrative law 
analysis to the same exercise of discretion. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration),
32
 for example, dealt with the discretionary 
authority of the Minister to deport refugees in circumstances where they 
                                                                                                             
27  See Ross, supra, note 13, and Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1996] S.C.J. 
No. 98, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.). 
28  [2000] S.C.J. No. 66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little Sisters”].  
29  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
30  R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.). 
31  See Little Sisters, supra, note 28, at para. 204. Justice Iacobucci, writing for himself and 
two other members of the Court, dissented on this point. He held that the legislation itself was 
unconstitutional since it did not contain sufficient safeguards against unconstitutional enforcement. 
For the minority, simply trusting the customs bureaucracy to improve its administration of the Act 
was not enough, and they would have imposed a different decision-making structure to remedy the 
Charter breach. 
32  [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suresh”].  
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faced the possibility of torture.
33 
Suresh challenged the Minister’s 
deportation order on both Charter and administrative law grounds. 
A unanimous Court conducted both a Charter review of the enabling 
provision and an administrative review of the Minister’s decision 
pursuant to that provision, eventually determining that the process by 
which Suresh was ordered deported violated his Charter rights.  
With its decision in Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-
Bourgeoys,
34
 the Court made its first effort to develop a more 
comprehensive approach to the dilemma of whether a Charter or 
administrative law analysis should apply to administrative action. 
Multani involved the discretionary decision of a school board to prohibit 
a Sikh student from wearing his kirpan, a ceremonial dagger, to school. 
The student and his family challenged the decision as an infringement of 
his freedom of religion. The Supreme Court was unanimous in allowing 
the challenge and striking down the Board’s decision but it split 6:2 on 
whether a Charter or administrative law analysis should be applied in 
reaching this result. 
Madame Justice Charron for the majority adopted a Charter analysis 
since the central issue in the case was whether or not the Board’s 
decision complied with the requirements of the Charter.
35
 In contrast, 
Deschamps and Abella JJ. for the minority argued that an administrative 
law analysis should be conducted instead of a Charter analysis because 
the instrument being assessed by the Court was an administrative 
decision rather than a “norm of general application” such as “a law, 
regulation, or other similar rule of general application”.36 
The majority defined the role of administrative law solely in terms of 
jurisdiction and warned against allowing the fundamental values 
protected by the Charter to be dissolved into mere administrative law 
                                                                                                             
33  Id., at para. 2. Section. 53(1)(b) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, gave the 
Minister limited discretion to deport where: the refugee’s “life or freedom would be threatened” if he 
or she were returned to his or her country and the Minister’s belief that the refugee constituted a 
“danger to the security of Canada”. 
34  [2006] S.C.J. No. 6, 2006 SCC 6 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Multani”]. 
35  Id., at para. 2. The majority (Charron J., McLachlin C.J.C., Bastarache, Binnie and Fish JJ.) 
held that the Board’s decision infringed the student’s freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter 
and that the infringement could not be justified under s. 1. Justice LeBel wrote a separate opinion 
agreeing with the majority that a Charter analysis was appropriate but proposing that the s. 1 analysis 
be modified in cases involving administrative discretion, at paras. 140-155. 
36  Id., at paras. 85, 103. The minority would have reviewed the Board’s decision on a 
standard of reasonableness and would have concluded that the decision was unreasonable in 
disregarding the student’s freedom of religion. 
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principles.
37
 The majority position appears either to be unaware of or to 
discount the significant substantive role of administrative law in 
supervising the exercise of discretion and of public authority more 
broadly. It is difficult to reconcile the thin and one-dimensional view of 
administrative law in the majority judgment in Multani or Suresh with 
the robust view of administrative law animating earlier Supreme Court 
judgments such as Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration).
38
 
The Court revisited this debate in Doré.
39
 In Doré, the Court 
reviewed the decision of a provincial law society that imposed a 
disciplinary penalty on a lawyer for inappropriate criticism of a judge. 
The Court of Appeal approached Doré as a Charter case, much like 
Slaight Communications, but the Supreme Court took a different 
approach. Justice Abella, this time writing for the Court, adopted an 
administrative law analysis to review the Quebec Barreau’s decision and 
asserted that there is nothing in such an approach inconsistent with 
strong Charter protections. This approach is set out in the following 
terms: 
The alternative is for the Court to embrace a richer conception of 
administrative law, under which discretion is exercised “in light of 
constitutional guarantees and the values they reflect” (Multani, at para. 
152, per LeBel J.). Under this approach, it is unnecessary to retreat to a 
s. 1 Oakes analysis in order to protect Charter values. Rather, 
administrative decisions are always required to consider fundamental 
values. ... These cases emphasize that administrative bodies are 
empowered, and indeed required, to consider Charter values within 
their scope of expertise. Integrating Charter values into the 
administrative approach, and recognizing the expertise of these 
decision-makers, opens “an institutional dialogue about the appropriate 
use and control of discretion, rather than the older command-and-
control relationship” (Liston, at p. 100).
40
 
While the Court’s decision in Doré may have the potential to infuse 
Charter values throughout administrative justice and to develop a more 
“robust” approach to administrative law principles,41 it remains a skeletal 
                                                                                                             
37  Id., at para. 16. 
38  [1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Baker”]. 
39  Supra, note 4. 
40  Id., at para. 35. 
41  Id., at para. 34. 
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approach that needs to be fleshed out in the diverse contexts of 
administrative justice. Doré itself represented a less-than-ideal context in 
which to develop a Charter values approach, since the dispute was 
litigated on the basis of a Charter right (freedom of expression), even if 
expressive freedom may also be considered a value (a point elaborated 
below).  
The most important question that arises post-Doré might well be: 
where do Charter values come from? At first glance, this question is so 
straightforward as to be obvious. The source of Charter values must be 
the Charter itself. But this clarity quickly gives way to murk. Does every 
Charter right give rise to a corresponding value? Moreover, must values 
derive only from one or more particular rights, or can they flow from 
underlying Charter principles that are not set out in specific rights such 
as human dignity? It is to this question that our analysis now turns. 
1. Sources of Charter Values 
According to Peter Hogg, the concept of “Charter values” existing 
outside or beyond the interpretation of specific Charter rights can be 
traced to the 1986 decision in R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.,
42
 
where the Supreme Court ruled that common law principles ought to be 
consistent with the “fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution”.43 
Dolphin Delivery, of course, considered the issue of principles lying 
outside the application of the Charter (beyond the scope of section 32) 
rather than values giving rise to a different kind of application of the 
Charter.
 
The Court alluded to a concept of “Charter values” earlier that year in an 
entirely different context, while defining what a “free and democratic 
society” constitutes in R. v. Oakes.44 In Oakes, Dickson C.J.C. identified 
values such as the “respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, 
commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation for a wide 
variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in 
social and political institutions which enhance the participation of 
individuals and groups in society” as the genesis of the rights and 
                                                                                                             
42  [1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dolphin Delivery”]. 
43  Peter W. Hogg, “Equality as a Charter Value in Constitutional Interpretation” (2003) 
20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 113, at 116 [hereinafter “Hogg”]. 
44  [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
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freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.
45
 Interestingly, Dickson C.J.C. 
adopted the approach that Charter values underlie Charter rights as 
opposed to the rights being the source for the values. Values in this 
context, in other words, temper or limit rights. For this reason, not every 
Charter value will accord with a specific Charter right and not every right 
must give rise to a specific value.
46  
These references to Charter values were offered for the purpose of 
explaining (or demarcating) Charter rights, rather than developing an 
alternative framework for aligning administrative justice and the Charter. 
That said, the Court has used Charter values to extend the scope of Charter 
rights. For instance, in Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector 
Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, McLachlin C.J.C. used the values 
identified in Oakes to give rise to a new protected right under section 2(d): 
We conclude that the protection of collective bargaining under s. 2(d) 
of the Charter is consistent with and supportive of the values 
underlying the Charter and the purposes of the Charter as a whole. 
Recognizing that workers have the right to bargain collectively as part 
of their freedom to associate reaffirms the values of dignity, personal 
autonomy, equality and democracy that are inherent in the Charter.
47
 
Chief Justice McLachlin reaffirmed the findings in Oakes by 
highlighting that “[h]uman dignity, equality, liberty, respect for the 
autonomy of the person, and the enhancement of democracy are among 
the values that underlie the Charter”.48 Two years after Health Services, 
the Court offered the following in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of 
Wilson Colony:
49
  
The deleterious effects of a limit on freedom of religion requires us to 
consider the impact in terms of Charter values, such as liberty, human 
dignity, equality, autonomy, and the enhancement of democracy: 
Thomson Newspapers, at para. 125; see also Health Services and 
Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 
                                                                                                             
45  Id., at para. 64. 
46  See, for example, Angela Cameron and Paul Daly, who argue that Dickson C.J.C.’s 
approach to proportionality in Oakes constitutes a Charter value that must be considered by 
administrative decision-makers, in “Furthering Substantive Equality through Administrative Law: 
Charter Values in Education” [hereinafter “Cameron & Daly”]. On file with authors. 
47  [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, 2007 SCC 27, at para. 86 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Health Services”]. 
48 As McLachlin C.J.C. notes, these values were also reaffirmed in R. v. Zundel, [1992] S.C.J. 
No. 70, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.) and Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern 
Affairs), [1999] S.C.J. No. 24, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 (S.C.C.). See Health Services, id., at para. 81. 
49  [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, 2009 SCC 37 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”]. 
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2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391. The most fundamental of these 
values, and the one relied on in this case, is liberty — the right of 
choice on matters of religion.
50 
 
Two tribunal cases underscore how Charter values and Charter rights 
interact. In the pre-Health Services case Re Telus Communications Inc.,
51
 
the Canadian Industrial Relations Board considered whether requiring 
employees to join a bargaining unit in the absence of a representation vote 
violated their freedom from compelled association. The Board relied on 
the Federal Court of Appeal decision British Columbia Terminal Elevator 
Operators’ Assn. v. International Longshore and Warehouse Union, 
Canada
52
 to find that the right to be free from compelled association 
constituted a Charter value stemming from section 2(d); however, the 
tribunal did not cite a Charter value supporting the right to collective 
bargaining. Arguably, it found quite the opposite: International Longshore 
highlighted that the freedom to express one’s “opinion and commitment to 
the principles of trade union solidarity by respecting the lawful picket lines 
of others” did not constitute a Charter value.  
However, in the post-Health Services decision Re Certain Employees 
of Brandt Tractor Ltd. v. I.U.O.E., Local 115, the British Columbia 
Labour Relations Board cited Health Services, and pursuant to the Doré 
framework, balanced the established right of employees not to associate 
under the Labour Relations Code with the value of collective bargaining 
and the avoidance of industrial instability in the workplace.
53 
 
In this way, Charter values have migrated from the judicial context to 
the context of administrative justice, but without serious or sufficient 
discussion of the implications of this shift. The decision in Brandt 
Tractor further demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between Charter 
values and Charter rights but also reveals a lack of coherence in the 
                                                                                                             
50  Id., at para. 88. 
51  [2004] C.I.R.B.D. No. 19, 2004 CIRB 278 (C.I.R.B.), judicial review denied [2004] 
F.C.J. No. 2123, 2004 FCA 438 (F.C.A.). 
52  [2001] F.C.J. No. 459, 2001 FCA 78 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “International Longshore”]. 
53  [2012] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 192 (B.C.L.R.B.) [hereinafter “Brandt Tractor”]. Labour 
Relations Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 244. A similar view was endorsed by the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal in Egg Films v. Nova Scotia (Labour Board), [2014] N.S.J. No. 150, 2014 NSCA 33 
(N.S.C.A.) [hereinafter “Egg Films”]. The Court cited the Nova Scotia Labour Board’s interpretation 
of Doré with approval: “The Board can only infer that the Supreme Court of Canada was strongly 
reinforcing the notion that labour relations tribunals must be careful to ensure that in interpreting 
their constitutive statutes, they engage in a purposive interpretational approach which is consonant 
with the Charter values of freedom of association in Charter section 2(d)” (emphasis added). See 
Egg Films, id., at para. 45. 
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determination of whether a matter is better suited to Charter rights or a 
Charter values approach.  
One way forward may be to harken back to a pre-Doré approach — 
such as that articulated by the Court in Baker.
54
 In Baker, the Court 
decided that administrative decision-makers ought to use their discretion 
“in accordance with the principles of the rule of law … in line with 
general principles of administrative law governing the exercise of 
discretion, and consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms”.55 The Court expanded on the need for decision-makers to 
negotiate the rule of law, administrative law and Charter principles by 
submitting that their “discretion must be exercised in accordance with the 
boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles of the rule of law, the 
principles of administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian 
society, and the principles of the Charter”.56 While Charter rights were 
raised in Baker (and fully argued), the Court chose to resolve the 
challenge on administrative law grounds with reference to the 
importance of Charter values in circumscribing the exercise of 
administrative discretion. 
David Dyzenhaus has argued that Baker advanced the concept of the 
“common law constitution”.57 He sees the rule of law as the fundamental 
value that the Charter and the common law Constitution articulate but do 
not exhaust.
58 
However, it is unclear whether Dyzenhaus suggests that 
Charter values are subsumed within the wider principles of the rule of 
law or the other way around. In a subsequent paragraph, he suggests that 
decision-makers are subject to rule of law values, which are “considered 
to be the fundamental or constitutional values of the society”.59 At the 
end of the day, distinguishing Charter values from other aspects of the 
“common law constitution” may result in distinctions with little 
difference. The key principle for our purposes is that where an 
adjudicative decision-maker is reviewing an exercise of discretion, the 
first recourse of the adjudicator should be to Charter values. Arguably, a 
matter should only proceed to a hearing based on a Charter right where a 
Charter values framework is not able to resolve the challenge at issue. 
                                                                                                             
54  Supra, note 38. 
55  Id., at para. 53. 
56  Id., at para. 56. 
57  David Dyzenhaus, “Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative 
Law” (2002) 27 Queen’s L.J. 445, at 448 [hereinafter “Dyzenhaus”]. 
58  Id., at 498.  
59  Id., at 499. 
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Courts and tribunals have used the passages in Baker referred to 
above to limit the exercise of discretion when societal and constitutional 
interests were at stake. For instance, the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
Deloitte & Touche LLP v. Ontario (Securities Commission)
60
 and the 
Ontario Securities Commission in Re Black
61 
invoked the passages in 
Baker to rule that the Commission’s statutorily conferred discretion to 
authorize disclosure in the public interest was restricted by the Charter. 
The Ontario Securities Commission in Black relied on Charter values in 
its analysis to determine the extent to which disclosure implicated the 
public interest.
62 
 
The requirement to consider constitutional principles, however, has 
also created inconsistencies in applying the Charter in administrative 
realms. In Lalonde v. Ontario, consistent with the approach the Supreme 
Court adopted in Baker, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the 
Health Restructuring Commission was obligated to consider the 
constitutional principles of “respect for and protection of minorities” in 
exercising its discretion to downscale health services.
63 
As the Court of 
Appeal notes: “If the values of an international convention not adopted in 
statute form by Parliament have a bearing on the validity of the exercise 
of ministerial discretion, it must be the case that failure to take into 
account a fundamental principle of the Constitution when purporting to 
act in the public interest renders a discretionary decision subject to 
judicial review.”64 
The Ontario Superior Court in Tremblay v. Lakeshore (Town), by 
contrast, held that a municipality was not obliged to consider the interests 
of the French linguistic minority because “the case is to be determined on 
traditional administrative law principles rather than constitutional 
analysis”.65 While the issue here may simply be semantics (the difference 
between a discretionary decision-maker being “obligated” to consider 
constitutional principles as opposed to the failure to consider such 
principles giving rise to a prima facie case of unreasonableness), the 
outcome of a case may turn on such characterizations. Doré suggests that 
                                                                                                             
60  [2002] O.J. No. 2350, 159 O.A.C. 257, at para. 29 (Ont. C.A.), affd [2003] S.C.J. No. 62, 
[2003] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.). 
61  2007 LNONOSC 1055, 31 O.S.C.B. 10397 (O.S.C.) [hereinafter “Black”]. 
62  Id., at paras. 87-88. 
63  [2001] O.J. No. 4767, 56 O.R. (3d) 577, at para. 173 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Lalonde”] . 
64  Id., at para. 179. 
65  Tremblay v. Lakeshore (Town), [2003] O.J. No. 4292, 179 O.A.C. 123, at para. 22 
(Ont. S.C.J.). 
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the importance of a bright line between administrative law and 
constitutional principles may be diminishing. 
Charter values within the Doré framework are rooted in 
constitutional sources but take on significance within an administrative 
law analysis. There remains ambiguity, however, as to the precise sources 
of these Charter values within Canada’s Constitution. The significance of 
these sources is clearly the Charter itself. In Doré, for example, it is 
apparent that the source of the value of expressive freedom is the right to 
freedom of expression in section 2 of the Charter. In other settings, 
however, the relationship may be less linear. Privacy and human dignity 
have been recognized as Charter values even though they do not arise 
from a single Charter provision. More remote still, some Charter values 
(such as respect for minority rights) may be tied to unwritten or 
underlying constitutional principles or the “common law” Constitution.  
Addressing the question of where Charter values come from and how 
they are related to, but distinct from, Charter rights remains at an 
embryonic stage. Peter Hogg has argued that every Charter right likely 
has a corresponding Charter value, although this view has not been 
adopted by the courts.
66 
As discussed above, David Dyzenhaus’s 
discussion of Charter values in Baker adopts the premise that the Charter 
simply has made more explicit the fundamental values that already 
underlie Canada’s “common law constitution”.67 Charter values could 
also flow from the preambular language reflecting commitments to the 
rule of law and supremacy of God. We suggest that there may well be 
multiple sources for Charter values — as the Charter both extended and 
reflected Canada’s constitutional commitments.  
While recognizing the importance of Charter values in Doré, the 
Court did not explore or elaborate upon the source of those values or 
their boundaries. They are simply assumed to exist and to form a 
knowable conceptual framework to guide discretionary decision-
making.
68
 Since the Court in Doré did not provide a definitive list of 
values that are to inform administrative law decisions, previous 
jurisprudence and tribunal decisions may be of assistance. It is to this 
task that we now turn.  
                                                                                                             
66  Hogg, supra, note 43, at 117. 
67  Dyzenhaus, supra, note 57, at 453, 489. 
68  Supra, note 4, at para. 6. 
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2. The Scope of Charter Values 
As Nicolas Lambert has observed, the main problem with attempting 
to reconcile the various references to Charter values across disparate 
cases is the lack of precise definition or explanation as to what is or is 
not a Charter value and why.
69
 While any attempt to map the terrain of 
Charter values must necessarily be a tentative enterprise in light of this 
ambiguity, we argue that clarifying the scope of Charter values is 
essential to ensuring their coherent and principled application in the 
administrative justice context.  
One approach to Charter values (in the sense the term was used in 
the context of administrative justice in Doré) is that this refers to a 
method of applying Charter rights. In other words, unlike the situation 
where a Court (or tribunal) adjudicates a Charter challenge featuring the 
adversarial presentation of evidence, the shifting onus of proof under 
section 1 and an Oakes analysis, etc., a Charter values approach obviates 
this formal methodology in favour of an administrative law balancing of 
the Charter right at issue and the statutory objectives. On this view, the 
scope of Charter values is simply the various rights set out in the section 
of the Charter.
70
 In Doré, for example, the value at issue was expressive 
freedom, and its scope is as set out in section 2(b) of the Charter. 
A Charter values methodology could similarly be applied to the rights set 
out in section 15, section 7, and so forth. This approach has the value of 
clarity and transparency, but also appears to use a term, “Charter values”, 
that has been deployed to convey something different than simply the 
text of the Charter rights themselves. When the Court refers to the 
importance of Charter values in interpreting and developing the common 
law, for example, the Court has indicated that such values include 
“human dignity” and the “values enshrined in the Charter”.71  
The courts have recognized a number of Charter values in common 
law and constitutional settings. Will all these values be applicable to the 
context of administrative justice? While it is premature to attempt to map  
 
                                                                                                             
69  Correspondence with one of the authors and Professor Lambert, January 24, 2013, on file 
with authors. See also N. Lambert, “The Charter in the Administrative Process: Statutory Remedy or 
Refounding of Administrative Jurisdiction?” (2007) 13 Rev. Const. Stud. 21. 
70  We are grateful to discussions with David Wright for fleshing out this approach to the 
scope of Charter values. 
71  R. v. Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, at para. 49 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Salituro”]. 
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the entire terrain of Charter values in the context of administrative 
justice, those Charter values already recognized by the courts likely will 
serve as a point of departure. More importantly, the methodology 
employed by the courts in developing Charter values in judicial settings 
may shed light on how the scope of such values may be applied by 
administrative decision-makers. 
Below, we set out a non-exhaustive list of the Charter values which 
have been variously mentioned or elaborated by the courts, some of 
which parallel specific Charter rights, and some of which go beyond the 
specific text of the Charter.  
(a) Liberty 
As the Chief Justice asserted in the Hutterian Brethren decision, 
“liberty” is perhaps the most significant Charter value. Liberty has been 
discussed as a Charter value in at least two senses. First, in the positive 
sense, liberty has been framed as an expression of individual choice. 
Second, liberty has been used in the negative sense, as freedom from 
interference by the state. Justice Bertha Wilson addressed “liberty in the 
context” of the values underlying the Charter in her concurring reasons 
in Morgentaler: 
The idea of human dignity finds expression in almost every right 
and freedom guaranteed in the Charter. Individuals are afforded the 
right to choose their own religion and their own philosophy of life, 
the right to choose with whom they will associate and how they will 
express themselves, the right to choose where they will live and 
what occupation they will pursue. These are all examples of the 
basic theory underlying the Charter, namely that the state will 
respect choices made by individuals and, to the greatest extent 
possible, will avoid subordinating these choices to any one 
conception of the good life. 
Thus, an aspect of the respect for human dignity on which the Charter 
is founded is the right to make fundamental personal decisions without 
interference from the state. This right is a critical component of the 
right to liberty. Liberty, as was noted in Singh, is a phrase capable of a 
broad range of meaning. In my view, this right, properly construed, 
grants the individual a degree of autonomy in making decisions of 
fundamental personal importance. … 
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Liberty in a free and democratic society does not require the state to 
approve the personal decisions made by its citizens; it does, however, 
require the state to respect them.
72
 
While Wilson J.’s view of liberty did not attract majority support in 
Morgentaler, similar formulations have been adopted by the Court in 
discussing the value of liberty in subsequent cases, particularly as part of 
the section 1 justification analysis.  
In Hutterian Brethren, the Court considered whether a religious 
community’s freedom of religion was infringed by a requirement that 
photos accompany an application for a driver’s licence.73 The Chief 
Justice, as noted above, recognized that in determining whether an 
infringement is justified, the Court should consider not just Charter rights 
but the values underlying those rights, of which the most important is 
“liberty”. Because the incidental effect of the photo requirement for 
driver’s licences was not to preclude religious practice but rather to 
impose a cost on religious practice (where transportation options other 
than driving would have to be pursued), it constituted a reasonable limit. 
Had the incidental impact been to preclude the practice of a religious 
ritual or sacrament, as the ban on kirpans in schools at issue in Multani 
implicated, the Court would presumably have come to the opposite 
conclusion based on the liberty value. 
While the Court’s recourse to values such as liberty as part of the 
section 1 analysis has been incorporated into the Oakes framework of 
analysis, it remains to be worked out how such values will inform the 
balancing envisioned in Doré. At a minimum, the Court’s examination of 
the Charter value of liberty suggests that these values will be treated as a 
spectrum rather than an absolute point or bright line for purposes of such 
balancing. This is particularly relevant for administrative justice, where 
nearly every statutory tribunal or regulatory agency includes within its 
mandate the adjudication of state interference in the freedom of people to 
pursue their own choices.  
                                                                                                             
72  Supra, note 19, at 166-67. This passage was cited with approval by Iacobucci J. in 
Salituro, supra, note 71, in elaborating the application of Charter values to the development of the 
common law. 
73  Supra, note 49. 
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(b) Human Dignity 
The value of human dignity is invoked often in Charter jurisprudence 
but rarely explored.
74
 As noted above in Wilson J.’s reasons in 
Morgentaler, it is described as a value informing nearly all Charter 
rights. Additionally, it is referred to as a Charter value in Hill v. Church 
of Scientology.
75
 While examining the value of freedom of expression, 
discussed below, Cory J. submits that “the good reputation of the 
individual represents and reflects the innate dignity of the individual, a 
concept which underlies all the Charter rights”.76 That said, Cory J. was 
also careful to emphasize that the application of Charter values such as 
human dignity to common law rules is not the same as expanding the 
application of the Charter itself to all private action, and in so doing 
attempted the distinguish Charter rights from Charter values. Justice 
Cory explained:  
The most that the private litigant can do is argue that the common law 
is inconsistent with Charter values. It is very important to draw this 
distinction between Charter rights and Charter values. Care must be 
taken not to expand the application of the Charter beyond that 
established by s. 32(1), either by creating new causes of action, or by 
subjecting all court orders to Charter scrutiny. Therefore, in the context 
of civil litigation involving only private parties, the Charter will 
“apply” to the common law only to the extent that the common law is 
found to be inconsistent with Charter values.
77
  
We believe a similar approach underlies Doré. Human dignity has 
arisen not just in the expressive context but in a variety of other Charter 
settings. Where an exercise of discretion appears to undermine this value, 
should this be included within the scope of Charter values which an 
administrative decision-maker ought to consider? Pearl Eliadis, for 
example, has argued that cases concerning poverty law should be 
informed by the “Charter-inspired value” of human dignity.78  
If human dignity is within the scope of Charter values, then Charter 
values may become over-broad, inchoate and difficult to apply 
                                                                                                             
74  For discussion, see L. Sossin, “The ‘Supremacy of God’, Human Dignity and the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms” (2003) 52 U.N.B.L.J. 227 [hereinafter “Sossin”]. 
75  [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hill”]. See also WIC 
Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 41, 2008 SCC 40, at para. 79 (S.C.C.). 
76  Id., at para. 120. 
77  Id., at para. 95. 
78  For further discussion, see Sossin, supra, note 74. 
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coherently. If human dignity lies outside the scope of Charter values, 
however, then a two-tier approach to the Charter may develop, with 
courts pursuing a broad approach to the term while administrative 
adjudicators would be limited to a narrow approach. Given that what is at 
issue in the application of Charter values in administrative justice is an 
administrative law balancing, not a specific invalidation of any 
government action, then we would suggest the broader approach is more 
appropriate. Subject to judicial review on reasonableness grounds as 
envisioned in Doré, it should be for administrative decision-makers and 
adjudicators to determine the range of Charter values which have 
application in the framework of their specialized context. Yet the open-
ended and uncharted nature of such a value raises important concerns. 
How will parties and their advocates anticipate the ways in which a value 
as diffuse as “human dignity” might factor into the decision-making 
process? In a social benefits context, will it mean something similar to 
what it means in a prison or hospital context? Operationalizing values 
such as human dignity poses far more challenging dilemmas than 
recognizing those values, as we explore further in the final section of this 
study. 
(c) Equality 
Equality is a value that has underpinned decisions dealing with a 
variety of Charter rights, and also is set out as a specific guarantee in 
section 15 of the Charter. The extensive reference to the equality value 
lends support to Angela Cameron and Paul Daly’s view that it constitutes 
a fundamental principle of the Constitution, akin to those unwritten 
constitutional principles elaborated in the Secession Reference.
79 
In other 
words, the Charter value of equality goes well beyond the specific 
elaboration of the equality right under section 15. For example, Peter 
Hogg outlines several cases concerning freedom of association, the right 
to vote and principles of fundamental justice that are premised on the 
value of equality.
80
  
The equality value has been used in common law settings as well. In 
MacCabe v. Westlock Roman Catholic Separate School District No. 110,
81
  
                                                                                                             
79  Cameron & Daly, supra, note 46, at 19; see Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 
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80  Hogg, supra, note 43, at 121, 122, 126-30. 
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for example, the Alberta Court of Appeal ruled that the common law 
guiding tort remedies should try to be consistent with Charter values, 
which includes “equality”. Equality also has been referenced in 
administrative justice settings. In Ismail v. British Columbia (Human 
Rights Tribunal),
82
 for example, the British Columbia Superior Court 
employed a Doré analysis to balance the values of equality and free 
expression. 
(d) Autonomy  
Personal autonomy is a Charter value that has been used as an 
interpretive guide in common law settings.
83 
Here again, while captured 
in specific rights such as the right to be free from unreasonable search 
and seizure in section 8 of the Charter, autonomy extends beyond this 
and any other specific Charter right as well. For example, the Supreme 
Court in Salituro suggested that the common law rule invalidating the 
competence of a spousal witness in the context where the spouses are 
irreconcilably separated was inconsistent with Charter values, 
specifically that “individual choices [should] not be restricted 
unnecessarily”.84  
Justice Iacobucci, writing for the Court, explained the relevance of 
Charter values as follows: 
Where the principles underlying a common law rule are out of step 
with the values enshrined in the Charter, the courts should scrutinize 
the rule closely. If it is possible to change the common law rule so as to 
make it consistent with Charter values, without upsetting the proper 
balance between judicial and legislative action that I have referred to 
above, then the rule ought to be changed. The common law rule making 
an irreconcilably separated spouse an incompetent witness for the 
prosecution against the other spouse is inconsistent with the values in 
the Charter. Subject to consideration of the limits on the judicial role, 
the rule ought therefore to be changed. Society can have no interest in 
preserving marital harmony where spouses are irreconcilably separated 
because there is no marital harmony to be preserved.
85
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Mayo Moran has used Salituro to explain the importance of Charter 
values as a guide to the interpretation and application of the common 
law. For example, in addition to Iacobucci J.’s concerns over autonomy, 
the common law rule was premised on an anachronistic view of women 
and an exaggerated emphasis placed on the promotion of marital 
harmony.
86
 In this respect, the common law rule clashed with the equality 
values enshrined in the Charter.
87
 Moran uses this example to stress the 
need to look beyond specific guarantees in the Charter when interpreting 
the common law, in favour of a reading that is in accordance with the 
“basic underlying theory of the Charter”.88 From this standpoint, 
autonomy and equality values speak to the broader, more fundamental 
values of the Charter; it is against these underlying values that the 
common law develops.
89
 
This connection is not unique to autonomy and equality. Indeed, many 
Charter values (just like Charter rights) should be seen as mutually 
reinforcing and interlocking. This adds to the coherence of Charter values 
in administrative justice, but also to their complexity and variability. 
(e) Fairness  
In addition to the Charter values expressed above, numerous courts 
and commentators have noted values stemming from common law rules 
concerning process. The Charter value of fairness is particularly 
applicable to the sphere of administrative justice, where procedural 
fairness has universal relevance.  
Robert Currie notes that the Charter values of procedural fairness and 
a fair trial, embodied within sections 7 and 11(d), inform the common law 
rules of evidence.
90 
Currie goes on to demonstrate that other common law 
rules of defence, such as confession rules and the ability to make a full 
answer and defence, have been “constitutionalized” through their 
intersection with “Charter standards”.91 Kent Roach expands upon this 
point by demonstrating that the common law rules relating to admissibility 
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of evidence were modified in R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme
92
 in order to be 
consistent with Charter values.
93
 He notes that other common law 
presumptions such as fairness and respect for international commitments 
to human rights reflect Charter values, whereas common law presumptions 
such as the right to property have lost their resonance in the Charter era.
94
 
The decisions in Hennessy v. Horse Racing Alberta
95
 and Gonzalez v. 
Alberta (Driver Control Board)
96
 affirm Roach and Currie’s findings that 
procedural fairness and common law rules of evidence arguably are 
informed by Charter values as well.
97
 In Hennessy, the Queen’s Bench 
reviewed an appeal from the Tribunal of Horse Racing Alberta. The 
Court found that the claimant was denied procedural fairness and 
fundamental justice because he was unable to make a full answer and 
defence, which the Court considered a Charter value.
98
 
Finally, the Quebec Court of Appeal recently described “natural 
justice” as a Charter value emanating from section 7 of the Charter. In 
Syndicat des travailleuses et travailleurs de ADF - CSN v. Syndicat des 
employés de Au Dragon Forgé Inc, the Quebec Court of Appeal applied 
Doré to balance the objective of a law that sought to maintain 
confidentiality in disciplinary boards with the value of natural justice.
99
 
(f) Expressive Freedom 
The Supreme Court has identified “freedom of expression” as a 
Charter value. In its decisions concerning defamation,
100 
journalist-
sourced privilege
101
 and picketing,
102 
the Court has used the Charter value 
                                                                                                             
92  [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.). 
93  Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, 2d ed.,  Release No. 19, December 
2012 (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2012), at para. 14.780. 
94  Kent Roach, “Common Law Bills of Rights as Dialogue between Courts and 
Legislatures” (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 733, at 747-78. 
95  [2006] A.J. No. 1613, 2006 ABQB 903 (Alta. Q.B.) [hereinafter “Hennessy”]. 
96  [2001] A.J. No. 1159, 2001 ABQB 757 (Alta. Q.B.). 
97  See Currie, supra, note 90, and Roach, supra, note 93. See also A. (L.L.) v. B. (A.), [1995] 
S.C.J. No. 102, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.); R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 
411 (S.C.C.); and the 2014 Alberta Transportation and Safety Board decision, Re LRM, 2014 
ABTSB 266 (Alta. T.S.B.). 
98  Hennessy, supra, note 95, at para. 28. 
99  [2013] Q.J. No. 4292, 2013 QCCA 793, at para. 45 (Que. C.A.). 
100  Hill, supra, note 75; Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, 2009 SCC 61 (S.C.C.). 
101  R. v. National Post, [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, 2010 SCC 16 (S.C.C.). 
102  R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, 
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 156, at paras 106-107 (S.C.C.). 
(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) CHARTER VALUES AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 417 
of freedom of expression in order to rule on the validity of the common 
law in the Charter era. The use of the value was most recently applied by 
the Ontario Court of Appeal. In Jones v. Tsige, the Court of Appeal 
balanced the right to privacy with the Charter value of freedom of 
expression.
103 
 
Expressive freedom has also been applied in the context of 
administrative justice. In Goldberg v. Law Society (British Columbia), 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal discussed whether the Charter 
value of “freedom of expression” was engaged in a disciplinary hearing 
case. The Court highlighted the Charter value of freedom of expression, 
opposed to the Charter right of section 2(b), because “we [the court] do 
not have a Charter issue squarely before us”.104 Freedom of expression as 
a Charter value was confirmed in Pridgen v. University of Calgary, 
where the Court rejected the findings of the Review Committee and 
Board of Governors on the basis that it made no attempt to balance the 
statutory mandate with the right of freedom of expression.
105 
While the 
Court discussed freedom of expression in light of Charter rights and 
statute, its discussion of Charter values and application of Doré support 
the contention that freedom of expression constitutes a Charter value. 
The value was more clearly applied in the 2014 case Wilson v. 
University of Calgary.
106
 In Wilson, a student anti-abortion group held 
on-campus protests displaying graphic imagery. The university 
administrators, pursuant to their authority under the Post-secondary 
Learning Act,
107
 requested that the images be turned away from public 
viewing. In evaluating the administrators’ decision, the Alberta Court of 
Queen’s Bench balanced the Charter value of “free expression” with the 
statutory objective of promoting campus safety. 
Expressive freedom as a Charter value has also been identified at the 
tribunal level. In Taylor-Baptiste v. Ontario Public Service Employees 
Union
108 
and Marceau v. Brock University,
109 
the Ontario Human Rights 
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Tribunal used reference to the Charter value of expressive freedom as a 
tool in interpreting the Human Rights Code.
110
  
Most significantly, of course, expressive freedom was at issue in the 
Doré decision itself. Justice Abella recognized that “in dealing with the 
appropriate boundaries of civility, the severity of the conduct must be 
interpreted in light of the expressive rights guaranteed by the Charter, 
and, in particular, the public benefit in ensuring the right of lawyers to 
express themselves about the justice system in general and judges in 
particular”.111 The Court concluded that in light of the egregious content 
and tone of the lawyer’s complaint about the judge, the Court’s balancing 
of expressive freedom with the statutory objectives of the Barreau’s Code 
of Ethics “cannot be said to represent an unreasonable balance”.112 
(g) Religious Freedom 
Freedom of religion was recently identified as a Charter value within 
the Aboriginal context. In Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia, the 
Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations approved 
the development of a ski resort on Crown land.
113
 The land was sacred to 
the Ktunaxa people and was central to their spirituality. According to the 
petitioners, the proposed site would denigrate the area. In addition to 
their arguments under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
114
 the 
Ktunaxa alleged that the Minister’s decision infringed their section 2(a) 
Charter rights because it violated their spiritual practices and beliefs.
115
  
In assessing the petitioners’ arguments under section 2(a) of the 
Charter, the British Columbia Superior Court applied Doré to determine 
whether the decision-maker balanced the Charter value at stake — 
freedom of religion — with the statutory objectives of encouraging 
outdoor recreation and disposing Crown lands in the public interest, 
pursuant to the Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing Act and Land 
Act,
116
 respectively. When balancing Charter values with these 
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objectives, the Court noted that the Minister must “consider all relevant 
social, economic, and environmental factors”.117 
The Court found that the Minister’s decision was a reasonable 
balancing of the Charter value of freedom of religion with the applicable 
statutory objectives. While the Minister did not directly address the 
Charter issue when making the decision, the Court recognized that the 
Minister “sincerely recognise[d] the genuinely sacred values at stake for 
the Ktunaxa leadership”.118 Furthermore, the Minister made several 
changes to the proposal in order to accommodate Aboriginal concerns. 
These accommodations could support the reasonableness of the decision: 
[A]ny accommodation measure that addresses the substance of the 
asserted right in this case can be considered both in determining 
whether the duty to consult was met and in assessing whether the 
balancing of Charter values was proportionate. In saying this, I do not 
find the balancing of s. 2(a) to necessarily have the same procedural or 
substantive requirements as the duty to consult and accommodate in 
relation to an asserted aboriginal spiritual right. … 
… Though stated as in relation to the Ktunaxa’s asserted aboriginal 
spiritual right under s. 35, the same measures [accommodations] are 
germane to assessing whether the Minister’s decision represents a 
proportionate balancing of s. 2(a) with the applicable statutory 
objectives.
119
  
Applying accommodations made pursuant to section 35 to discern 
the reasonableness of an administrative decision is unique to cases that 
require both Aboriginal and administrative law analyses. Nevertheless, 
the central role that religious freedom played in determining the 
reasonableness of the Minister’s decision suggests the solidification of 
“religious freedom” as a Charter value. 
(h) Privacy  
Privacy represents yet another Charter value which is likely to find 
application in administrative justice contexts and which exists outside of 
the context of a specific Charter right. In M. (A.) v. Ryan,
120
 the Supreme 
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Court has employed Charter values to extend the scope of common law 
privilege to reflect changing “social and legal realities of our time”, and 
in particular the privacy of victims of sexual violence who seek 
psychiatric counselling.
121
  
In Gore v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (Ontario),
122
 for 
example, the appellant physicians disputed an investigation by the 
Registrar of the College of Physicians and Surgeons pursuant to 
the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991.
123
 The appellants argued that 
the regulation (and presumably, decisions made pursuant to the 
regulation) should be interpreted in light of the Charter values of 
protection of patient privacy and protection against self-incrimination. 
The Court ultimately chose not to invoke Charter values in deciding the 
case since the regulation was not ambiguous and a Charter values 
approach was thus unnecessary.
124 
However, the Court neither confirmed 
nor disputed the existence of the Charter values raised. 
3.  Conclusion 
The list above is not exhaustive, and should be seen as a dynamic 
rather than static aspect of the Charter’s application to administrative 
justice. We recognize that the scope of Charter values set out above is a 
somewhat subjective account of an ill-defined category. Other possible 
Charter values could be added, including, for example, mobility, 
mentioned in the context of Khadr v. Canada (Attorney General).
125
 In 
that case, the Federal Court reviewed the government’s decision to refuse 
Omar Khadr’s request for a passport. The Federal Court ruled that the 
“right to leave Canada is a sufficiently important aspect of an 
individual’s freedom” and constituted a Charter value.126 The Court also 
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argued that the issuance of a passport reflects the Charter value expressed 
by mobility rights.
127 
We viewed this value as simply overlapping the 
mobility right as opposed to a distinct value that could constrain 
discretion or guide statutory interpretation.  
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Multani highlighted the promotion 
of multiculturalism and diversity as consistent with the Charter although 
it did not characterize them as Charter values per se.
128 
Even if not 
elevated to the status of a Charter value, in Lalonde, as noted above, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal held that respect for and protection of minorities 
constituted an unwritten constitutional principle.
129
 Similarly, democracy 
was recognized as an unwritten constitutional principle in the Secession 
Reference,
130
 and invoked as a Charter value in Hutterian Brethren, as set 
out above. While mobility is arguably too narrow to constitute a Charter 
value, multiculturalism and the enhancement of democracy may be 
overly broad to fulfil this function. Alternatively, it may be that values 
such as mobility and multiculturalism are still inchoate and through 
further refinement and development may be recognized as within the 
scope of Charter values delineated above. 
Notwithstanding its tentative nature, we believe the scope of Charter 
values discussed above in Charter jurisprudence represents an important 
point of departure for the development of Charter values for 
administrative justice. While Charter values may be seen as limited 
simply to the text of Charter rights differently applied in administrative 
justice settings, this does not appear to be how the courts themselves 
have conceived of Charter values, nor would such a formalist approach 
be in keeping with the robust and adaptive administrative law framework 
invoked in Doré. That said, many of the values set out lack an important 
contextual dimension.  
Administrative justice, unlike courts, must also take into 
consideration the policy mandate of a particular decision-making body 
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and the purposive nature of statutory or prerogative authority. As the 
Supreme Court recognized in the context of Charter remedies in Conway, 
while a court may do anything that is “just and appropriate” pursuant to 
section 24(1) remedies, a tribunal could only remedy Charter breaches by 
recourse to their statutorily mandated powers.
131
 The Charter cannot, in 
other words, be used by a tribunal to frustrate or usurp the role of the 
legislature in demarcating the boundaries of that tribunal’s authority or 
its reasons for being. A similar conceptual framework, we suggest, 
applies in the context of Charter values. While the Charter jurisprudence 
can shed light on the scope of Charter values, it remains for each tribunal 
to determine which Charter values will be relevant to its mandate, and 
how to balance those values against its policy mandate. For example, 
while personal autonomy may be a broadly recognized Charter value, it 
will necessarily mean something different in the context of a privacy 
commission than in the context of a parole board. The variability in the 
application of Charter values mirrors the variability of other 
administrative law frameworks (for example, procedural justice) as 
discussed further below. In other words, in the administrative justice 
sphere, variability may be part of the solution, not the problem. 
While statutory and policy context are distinctly important for any 
analysis of the scope of Charter values in an administrative justice 
context, the Charter must continue to be a mechanism for advancing 
broader rights than those contained in a particular statutory or policy 
context. Charter values, in this sense, provide a bridge between 
fundamental and core values on the one hand, and the choices 
legislatures and executive government make on the other. Determining 
the scope of Charter values requires being attentive to both these 
dynamics in the diverse contexts of administrative justice. Further, the 
dilemmas accompanying the power of unelected judges to further policy 
aims and constrain democratic action through judicial review does not 
apply in the context of administrative justice.
132
 Here, the Charter cannot 
negate or “trump” legislative choices, but rather can be used to inform, 
refine, focus and interpret those choices. 
In light of the analysis above, our discussion turns to how 
administrative decision-makers (and the courts that review those 
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decisions) may operationalize Charter values in a fashion that is 
coherent, transparent, consistent, workable, and principled. 
III. OPERATIONALIZING CHARTER VALUES 
After Doré, the Supreme Court confirmed that tribunals have the 
opportunity to imbue their decisions regarding the exercise of 
administrative discretion with Charter values and engage in a more active 
form of constitutional interpretation. At the same time, Charter values 
remain an important tool of statutory interpretation where competing 
approaches to a statutory power are available. In still other cases, Charter 
values may inform how common law rules are interpreted and applied. 
Charter values in each of these contexts will be relevant to administrative 
justice. How can the consistency and coherence of these interpretations 
of Charter values be assured? In short, how can Charter values be 
developed through administrative justice decision-making? Is it open to 
tribunals to identify new Charter values or extend existing ones? In this 
section, we examine how administrative justice decision-makers have 
approached the task of delineating and operationalizing Charter values. 
In Black, the Ontario Securities Commission considered whether the 
right against self-incrimination and the right to make a full answer and 
defence constituted Charter values.
133
 The Commission attempted to 
balance these competing values by considering their merits and how the 
privileging of one would compromise the other. However, the 
Commission did not offer a definitive test to help us reconcile these 
values in the end.
134
 
Since Doré, tribunals have yet to achieve greater methodological 
clarity. For example, in C. (R.) v. District School Board of Niagara, the 
Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario granted the Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association intervener status for the purposes of discussing “how values 
of the [Charter] including s. 2(a) (freedom of religion) and s. 15 
(‘equality’) should inform the interpretation of the Code” in question.135 
While one can surmise that both “equality” and “freedom of religion” 
were Charter values for the purposes of C. (R.), the case did not 
crystallize a method for testing the existence of these values in future 
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cases. In Brandt Tractor,
136
 mentioned above, the British Columbia 
Labour Relations Board applied Doré in considering employees’ 
applications for partial decertification from their union under the Labour 
Relations Code.
 
 
Operationalizing Charter values should be seen as part of a model of 
administrative justice referred to as “active adjudication”.137 This form of 
more flexible adjudication may be particularly important in contexts 
where one or more parties often will have no legal representation and 
where adjudicators often will not have legal training. Tribunals are less 
constrained by an adversarial model of adjudication, and have developed 
methods to accommodate the challenges that vulnerable parties coming 
before the tribunal may experience. In the context of Charter values, this 
more effective and efficient model may involve the adjudicators 
identifying rights issues where the parties do not have the background or 
capacity to do so and taking steps to obtain the information or 
submissions necessary to adjudicate them. This may involve mechanisms 
that range from retaining amicus counsel to engaging in inquisitorial 
questioning, or developing interpretive guidelines upon which parties 
and decision-makers can rely.
138 
 
The methodology by which administrative decision-makers might 
integrate Charter values dates back to Slaight Communications and is 
fairly straightforward.
139
 So, for example, where two interpretations are 
open to a tribunal member and one will advance a Charter value more 
than the other, it should be preferred. When a statute’s meaning remains 
ambiguous, Charter values may be employed to inform the statutory 
language.
140
 Given the diversity of settings and variety of Charter values 
elaborated above, however, a more textured methodology may be 
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required to give effect to the application of Charter values to 
administrative discretion in Doré. We suggest the following approach as 
an example of such a methodology. 
1.  Discretionary Authority or Interpretive Scope 
First, the administrative decision-maker needs to identify a 
discretionary power, or a question of interpretation for which more than 
one approach would be plausible. As the courts have made clear in 
developing Charter values, this situation arises only where a decision-
maker is exercising discretion. This is an important constraint on 
administrative decision-makers applying the Doré framework. Charter 
values cannot be used either to invalidate a statutory provision or to 
render it inoperative in the sense available to such decision-makers if a 
legislative provision is impugned under the Charter per se. Only the 
application of the Charter itself can trigger such a remedy, and in such 
circumstances, additional procedural steps (e.g., issuing a notice of 
constitutional question) and substantive steps (e.g., the application of 
the Oakes test) are triggered. Thus, the first logical step in the application 
of Charter values is to identify the nature and scope of the discretion 
at issue. 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on what 
constitutes a “discretion”, suffice it to say that it may only arise where 
the wording or context of legislation makes clear that its application 
depends on the judgment of the person authorized to apply it, and where 
there is more than one possible option available to that authorized 
person.
141
 
2.  Identification of Potential Charter Value 
Second, the administrative decision-maker must conclude that the 
identified discretion engages a recognized Charter value (or, potentially, 
a novel value analogous to an existing Charter value). Administrative 
decision-makers cannot be expected to be intuitively aware of the range 
of Charter values; rather, tribunals should develop training and, ideally, 
guidelines, which highlight the Charter values most relevant to the 
                                                                                                             
141  For discussion, see L. Pottie & L. Sossin, “Demystifying the Boundaries of Public Law: 
Policy, Discretion and Social Welfare” (2005) 38 U.B.C. L. Rev. 147. 
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subject matter of the tribunal.
142
 For example, equality and expressive 
freedom might play a significant role in an education tribunal while 
privacy, autonomy and fairness might play a more significant role in a 
social benefits tribunal.  
While administrative decision-makers should be open to and 
consider submissions from the parties on Charter values, it is important 
to emphasize that fulfilling the goals of Charter values may require 
“active adjudication” on the part of decision-makers. Active adjudication 
in this context may involve a decision-maker raising a Charter value on 
her own (even if it is not raised by the parties). 
3. Balancing from Doré of the Value against the Statutory 
Objectives as Set Out in Doré 
Third, as set out by the Supreme Court in Doré, the next stage of the 
methodology would be the balancing exercise where the value of the 
Charter value is weighed against the objectives of the discretionary 
authority:  
How then does an administrative decision-maker apply Charter values 
in the exercise of statutory discretion? He or she balances the Charter 
values with the statutory objectives. In effecting this balancing, the 
decision-maker should first consider the statutory objectives. In Lake, 
for instance, the importance of Canada’s international obligations, its 
relationships with foreign governments, and the investigation, 
prosecution and suppression of international crime justified the prima 
facie infringement of mobility rights under s. 6(1) (para. 27). In Pinet, 
the “twin goals of public safety and fair treatment” grounded the 
assessment of whether an infringement of an individual’s liberty 
interest was justified (para. 19). 
Then the decision-maker should ask how the Charter value at issue will 
best be protected in view of the statutory objectives. This is at the core 
of the proportionality exercise, and requires the decision-maker to 
                                                                                                             
142  The importance of training and enhancing tribunals’ capacities in relation to Charter 
application has been highlighted by Sheila Wildeman in her presentations, including the Canadian 
Institute for the Administration of Justice (CIAJ) Roundtable on Administrative Law held in Toronto 
on May 24, 2013, and forthcoming research on Charter values. See correspondence from Professor 
Wildeman, June 20, 2013, on file with the authors. 
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balance the severity of the interference of the Charter protection with 
the statutory objectives.
143
 
While the Court has been explicit in stating this is not simply a 
different venue for the application of the Oakes approach, it is likely that 
administrative decision-makers will search for an analogous proportionality 
framework in order to provide some degree of transparency and rigour in 
this balancing process. Tellingly, the early applications of Doré have not 
yielded innovative templates for this balancing.  
One balancing template consistent with Abella J.’s invocation of 
enriching the administrative law approach would be to adapt the 
framework developed by the Supreme Court in Baker (and applied to 
Charter settings in Suresh) in order to determine the degree of fairness 
appropriate to particular settings. In other words, when considering how 
to reconcile statutory objectives with Charter values, the administrative 
decision-maker should look to the nature and purpose of the statute, the 
nature of the discretion at issue, the importance of the decision to 
affected parties, the legitimate expectations of those affected and any 
specialized procedures — such as applicable guidelines — which may 
guide the decision-maker. While the proportionality exercise in fairness 
determinations is of a different kind than that contemplated in Doré, the 
contextual nature of such determinations seems well suited to working 
through how Charter values should inform constrains on the exercise of 
discretion.  
For example, where the Charter values amplify the statutory 
objectives, or where such values are of particular importance for affected 
vulnerable parties, those Charter values might be given more weight. I 
would suggest this framework captures the approach Abella J. adopted in 
Doré. She acknowledged the importance of expressive freedom and the 
scope for a lawyer to criticize a judge. She then considered the nature of 
the statute in question and the importance of the Code of Ethics in 
promoting public confidence in the administration of justice and civility 
among lawyers. Further, she considered the nature of the disciplinary 
committee’s discretion, which is expansive. She noted the impact on 
Doré himself, highlighting that only a reprimand was at stake. Finally, 
she acknowledged the Committee’s deliberative process in determining 
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that Doré’s conduct “overstepped” generally accepted norms of 
“moderation and dignity”.144 
We would suggest that such an approach has the added advantage of 
being familiar and accepted as a legitimate framework among 
administrative decision-makers, judges and administrative law advocates 
alike, and where a rich and textured body of jurisprudence and 
commentary already exists on which to build. 
Whatever approach is adopted by a decision-maker, it will be a 
challenge for parties and advocates to predict at the outset how Charter 
values might affect their positions in an administrative adjudication. As 
with the development of procedural fairness within administrative 
justice, clarity will follow experience, as different administrative 
decision-makers sort out the proper application of the Doré framework in 
their statutory context. The courts will have a role to play here as well, 
both to establish some key parameters and through appropriate 
deference, to recognize and validate the necessary space for 
administrative decision-makers to develop an approach to the Charter 
commensurate with their perspective, expertise and experience. 
The proper balancing of Charter values and the objectives of the 
statute will also depend on the adoption by administrative decision-
makers of “active adjudication” strategies. In this sense, while decision-
makers may benefit from the submission of parties, they cannot depend 
solely on such submissions in settings where most parties are 
unrepresented and cannot be expected on their own to identify and argue 
Charter values. Further, the importance of active adjudication to the 
effectiveness of the Doré framework once again demonstrates the 
importance of tribunal training and resources such as guidelines on 
tribunal-specific Charter values.  
4. Explanation of Process and Results of Balancing in Clear Reasons 
Having engaged in the balancing exercise outlined above, the fourth 
stage of the Charter values methodology involves setting out a clear 
explanation for the conclusion reached above. The importance of reasons 
in this context cannot be overstated. Because of the inherently subjective 
aspect of the balancing exercise envisioned in Doré, reasons play a dual 
role. First, reasons will contribute to the credibility and legitimacy of the 
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development of Charter values rooted in the realities of administrative 
justice. Second, reasons perform an accountability function, confirming 
both the soundness of the rationale underlying a decision-maker’s 
decision, and assuring a greater degree of consistency and oversight. 
The methodology set out above can be adapted to the diverse range 
of administrative decision-making contexts. Over time, if followed, this 
methodology would generate a body of training materials, guidelines and 
reasons on Charter values which, if paired with thoughtful and 
considered judicial commentary on judicial reviews of such decisions, 
could result in a constructive and principled framework for the 
application of discretionary authority in the era of the Charter.  
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore in detail the 
deference contemplated by the Supreme Court in Doré applicable to 
decisions by administrative adjudicators as to Charter values, it follows 
that the rationale for such deference is the distinctive and different lens 
on the Charter’s application to administrative justice that such 
adjudicators use.
145
 It is important, through reasons, to see how this lens 
will come to view the Charter in distinctive terms. Moreover, the 
standard of reasonableness to be applied to such determinations will 
depend on reasons in order to ensure meaningful oversight of 
administrative decision-makers by the courts.
146
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this exploratory analysis, we have sought to advance the view of a 
sphere of Charter justice that is distinctly suited to administrative justice. 
We have discussed the ways in which the Charter and administrative law 
doctrines have been reconciled in the jurisprudence leading up to Doré. 
We have canvassed the sources of Charter values, and offered a tentative 
summary of the scope of Charter values to this point in time. Finally, we 
have discussed how a framework of Charter values could be 
operationalized with the diverse contexts of administrative justice.  
In a sense, the Doré framework opens up the possibility of a new and 
different kind of Charter dialogue, between administrative decision-makers 
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146  For discussion of the relationship between reasons and reasonableness, see Newfoundland 
and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), [2011] S.C.J. 
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and courts, in which expertise in policy-specific decision-making 
contexts may inform the development of Charter values and vice versa. 
Our focus has been both on the conceptual coherence of Charter 
values and on how the Charter can be adapted to the distinct realities of 
administrative justice. In developing an approach to the Charter rooted 
not in courts and the formal determination of rights, but in the realm of 
discretionary decision-making and the oversight of such decisions, we 
believe the promise of the Charter to protect those affected by the 
exercise of public authority can at last be meaningfully fulfilled. 
